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  Local political and community leaders and the owners of 
professional sports teams frequently claim that professional sports 
facilities and franchises are important engines of economic development in 
urban areas.  These structures and teams allegedly contribute millions of 
dollars of net new spending annually and create hundreds of new jobs, and 
provide justification for hundreds of millions of dollars of public subsidies 
for the construction of many new professional sports facilities in the 
United Sates over the past decade.  Despite these claims, economists have 
found no evidence of positive economic impact of professional sports teams 
and facilities on urban economies.  We critically review the debate on the 
economic effects of professional sports and their role as an engine of urban 




Economic Development and Sports 
 
On the surface, sports facilities and franchises appear to be prime 
candidates for economic development projects aimed at revitalizing urban 
neighborhoods.  Unlike abstract economic development tools like tax 
credits and empowerment zones, sports facilities – stadiums, arenas, 
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football pitches, etc. – are highly visible structures.  Sporting events are 
wildly popular throughout the world and widely understood and 
appreciated by residents of cities.  In the United States, new sports 
facilities are frequently cited as important components of urban 
redevelopment initiatives and sources of considerable economic growth in 
terms of job creation and income generation.  Cities provide the owners of 
professional sports franchises with hundreds of millions of dollars of 
subsidies for the construction of new stadiums and arenas and expect 
these facilities to generate economic benefits exceeding these subsidies by 
large margins. 
 
However, a growing body of evidence indicates that professional sports 
facilities, and the franchises they are home to, may not be engines of 
economic growth in urban neighborhoods.  Econometric studies of the 
determination of income and employment in US cities find no evidence of 
positive economic benefits associated with past sports facility construction 
and some studies find that professional sports facilities and teams have a 
net negative economic impact on income and employment.  These results 
suggest that at best, professional sports teams and facilities provide non-
pecuniary benefits like civic pride, and a greater sense of community, 
along with consumption benefits to those attending games and following 
the local team in the media; at worst, residents of cities with professional 
sports teams pay a high cost for the privilege, both in terms of large public 
subsidies and in terms of lost income and employment.  
 
The striking difference between the claims of the champions of sports-led 
urban redevelopment, expressed through prospective “economic impact 
studies,” and the results in retrospective econometric studies published in 
peer-reviewed academic journals, raises a number of interesting and 
important questions about the public financing of professional sports 
facilities.  Are sports-led urban redevelopment projects viable?  Are large 
subsidies for the construction and renovation of professional sports 
facilities justified by tangible, or even by intangible, non-pecuniary 
benefits to the residents of urban areas?  What about voting on 
referendums for these subsidies – do their outcomes suggest that 
taxpayers favor subsidies for professional sports teams despite the 
potential costs? 
 
To better frame and begin to answer these questions, we critically survey 
the literature on the economic impact of professional sports on urban 
economies in order to assess their role as engines of economic 
development. We focus on those studies that have examined the local   3 
economy before and after the construction of a facility or the arrival of a 
franchise.  Additionally, we describe the literature on the effects of mega-
events, like the Super Bowl and the Olympics, and the literature on the 
political economy of stadium construction.  We begin with a brief 
discussion of the financing of stadium and arena construction. 
 
 
Public Financing of Stadium Construction 
 
There has been an enormous boom in publicly financed sports stadium 
construction in the United States over the past decade.  This boom is 
sometimes traced to the opening of Oriole Park in Camden Yards, the 
home of the Baltimore Orioles Major League Baseball (MLB) franchise.  
Unlike many of the new suburban sports facilities built earlier, Oriole 
Park is located in Baltimore’s Central Business District and figures 
prominently in the redevelopment plan for the downtown area of 
Baltimore.  Oriole Park was widely praised on aesthetic and economic 
grounds and this model was soon widely copied by many other cities.  The 
land acquisition and stadium construction costs for this sports facility 
were almost entirely borne by taxpayers, another feature that was widely 
copied by other cities. 
 
Table 1 contains information about the costs and extent of public 
subsidization for all of the new professional football, basketball, and 
baseball facilities opened in the United States in the past six years.  This 
table shows the total costs of the new facility, including land acquisition 
costs, and the total amount of public money spent on these facilities in 
constant 2003 dollars.  A number of additional facilities are already under 
construction or in the planning stages in the United States and there were 
also several new facilities opened in Canada during this period.  With a 
few notable exceptions, the majority of the financing from these new 
sports facilities came from public, not private, sources.  Note that some of 
these facilities are home to both a professional basketball franchise in the 
National Basketball Association and a professional hockey franchise in the 
National Hockey League.  There has also been a boom in the construction 
of new minor league professional baseball facilities over the past decade, 
but Table 1 does not include information on facilities that host minor 
league baseball, professional soccer, or other professional sports franchises 
in the US.  
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On average, public financing accounted for 65% of the cost of these 
projects, and the average amount of public spending was $208 million.   
The median, and average age of the facilities replaced was 31 years, which 
represents a stadium built sometime in the late 1960s.  A number of cities 
(Cincinnati, Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; Houston, Texas; Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania; Denver, Colorado; and Seattle, Washington) replaced two 
professional sports facilities during this brief period.  In total, the sports 
facility construction projects on this table accounted for $5.4 billion dollars 
of public spending. 
 
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) point out that the effective useful economic 
life of a sports stadium appears to be about 30 years, a figure consistent 
with the average age of the stadiums replaced in the past six years.  There 
are currently 90 professional football, basketball and baseball franchises 
in North America and very few multi-purpose stadiums, suggesting an 
average of three facilities replaced a year in steady-state equilibrium.   
Some additional expansion or relocation is possible in all three leagues.  
Many of the new sports facilities built in the past ten years contain 
features like extensive sections of premium seats and luxury boxes, 
swimming pools, restaurants, hotels, and theme-park like attractions that 
make sports facilities into entertainment centers.  These features have the 
potential to generate revenues well above the familiar ticket, food, drink 
and parking revenue streams generated by sports facilities built ten or 
twenty years ago and could start a “stadium arms race” that would reduce 
the effective economic lifetime of sports facilities, leading to even more 
new facility construction in the future.   
 
Even without a decrease in the effective economic lifetime of sports 
facilities, there will continue to be a significant amount of sports facility 
construction in the future.  If the recent past provides any guidance, much 
of this future construction will be publicly financed.  What economic 




Evidence on the Effectiveness of Sport-led Development 
 
There are two categories of evidence about the economic impact of 
professional sports facilities on urban economies.  Every time the owner of 
a professional sports franchise wants a new facility built using public 
financing, an “economic impact study” is commissioned to justify the   5 
spending of hundreds of millions of dollars of public money on the projects. 
 These impact studies are always prospective in nature – they forecast the 
future economic impact flowing from a new publicly financed sports 
facility – and always conclude that there will be large positive economic 
benefits to the local economy; these positive benefits typically include 
hundreds of millions of dollars of additional tax revenues and income, and 
hundreds or, in some cases, thousands of new jobs created.  Impact studies 
commonly rely on the use of spending multipliers to arrive at these large 
positive economic benefits.  Economic impact studies are commonly 
performed by consultants or large consulting firms. Referring to these 
studies, Crompton (1995) says, "Too often, the motives of those 
commissioning an economic impact analysis appear to lead to adoption of 
procedures and underlying assumptions that bias the resultant analysis so 
the numbers support their advocacy position".  He continues by critiquing 
the typical assumptions and procedures that produce the biased results, 




The second category of evidence about the economic impact of professional 
sports on urban economies comes from retrospective studies published in 
peer-reviewed academic journals.  Most of these studies use econometric 
techniques to assess the effect that professional sports had on urban 
economies, in terms of changes in the average level of income per capita, 
average earnings of workers in various sectors of a city's economy, and 
employment.  We discuss these studies in more detail below.  Some 
evaluations of the effects of stadiums and professional sports involve cost 
benefit analysis and others use contingent valuation techniques.  We 
discuss the contingent valuation approach in more detail in the section on 
non-pecuniary benefits. 
 
An example of a retrospective study that does a cost-benefit analysis is 
that of Mark S. Rosentraub and David Swindell (1991) who performed a 
type of impact study analyzing the effects of relocation of a minor league 
baseball team into Fort Wayne, Indiana.  The city of Fort Wayne was 
asked by owners of the Wausau Timbers, a minor league baseball team, to 
build the team a stadium so that the owners could relocate the franchise 
to Fort Wayne.  The ultimate decision of the city of Fort Wayne was to 
offer to loan the investors $1.2 million dollars at 6.48% interest over 15 
years to be used in the renovation of an existing stadium.  The team was 
required to raise an additional $750,000.  The city would pay for 
maintenance and the team would pay no rent for use of the facility.  The   6 
owners could not find private sector support for the $750,000 so the team 
was not relocated.  Rosentraub and Swindell (1991) conclude that Fort 
Wayne made the right decision in not funding the construction of a new 
stadium and that the loan "was the very most the city should have offered 
to the owners of the team." 
 
Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) recently surveyed the growing literature on 
retrospective studies of the economic impact of sports facilities and 
franchises on local economies.  The literature published in peer-reviewed 
academic journals differs strikingly from the predictions in “economic 
impact studies.”  No retrospective econometric study found any evidence of 
positive economic impact from professional sports facilities or franchises 
on urban economies.  While evidence exists suggesting that narrowly 
defined occupational groups, like workers employed in the sports industry 
(SIC Code industry 79 – Recreation and Amusements), benefit from the 
construction of new sports facilities, building new sports facilities and 
attracting new professional sports teams did not raise income per capita or 
total employment in any US city.  In fact, some research has found a 
negative economic impact of professional sports on urban economies.   
 
In this academic literature, Rosentraub, Swindell, Przybylski, and Mullins 
(1994), Baade (1996), Baade and Dye (1990), Baade and Sanderson (1997), 
and Coates and Humphreys (2003) have found no economic impact of 
professional sports facilities and franchises on income and employment.  
Noll and Zimbalist (1997) edited a collected volume focused on this topic 
that explores a number of economic and political issues related to the 
economic impact of professional sports on cities.  Coates and Humphreys 
(1999, 2001a) found evidence of a negative overall impact of professional 
sports on the economies of all US cities that were home to a professional 
football, basketball, or baseball team over the period 1969-1998.  
 
Coates and Humphreys (1999) attacked the issue of the effect of 
professional sports on local economies differently than had earlier 
researchers.  This study pooled data from each city that had either a 
professional football, baseball, or basketball team at any time during the 
period 1969 to 1995.  In this way, the study used panel data techniques to 
control for city and year specific influences on the level of income per 
capita.  The study also introduced a broad array of variables to capture the 
entire spectrum of sport's effects on the local economies instead of the 
simple indicator variable for the presence of a sports team used in 
previous research.  For example, variables included dummy variables for 
the entry or exit of teams within the past 10 years, and for construction of   7 
stadiums within 10 years, the seating capacity of each of the sport 
facilities in the city, and the presence of a team in each of the three sports. 
 The implication of their analysis was that taken as a whole, the sports 
environment tended to reduce the per capita personal income in the city 
by a small but statistically significant amount. 
 
Coates and Humphreys (2003) extended this research to examine the 
earnings and employment in narrowly-defined occupational groups in US 
cities with professional sports teams.  In this study, the earnings and 
employment in the SIC-code industry containing sports facilities and 
teams – SIC-code 79, Amusements and Recreation – were higher but the 
earnings and employment in other important sectors like Retail Trade, 
Hotels, and Eating and Drinking Establishments were lower.  The 
economic benefit from sports facilities and franchises appears to be 
concentrated in a small sector of the economy and comes at the expense of 
other sectors of urban economies. 
 
The lack of positive economic impact associated with professional sports 
facilities and franchises, as well as the provocative finding of overall net 
negative economic impacts, suggests a number of interesting economic 
questions.  How can the sports environment in a city reduce per capita 
personal income?  What do we know about the value of non-pecuniary or 
“consumption benefits” to residents of cities with professional sports 
teams?  What about mega sports events like the Super Bowl or the 
Olympic Games, do they generate positive economic benefits?  Sports 
subsidies are often voted on in local referenda, what can we learn about 
tax payers desires for sports facilities based on these votes?   We examine 
these issues in the following sections. 
 
 
Explanations for the Negative Economic Impact of Sports 
 
Given the preponderance of evidence that indicates at best no effect from 
stadiums and arenas, and a good deal of evidence of negative effects, it is 
necessary to explain why these results seem plausible.  There are several 
reasons, in fact, and they are not mutually exclusive.  In other words, they 
can all be working simultaneously to produce the results that the sports 
environment induces a reduction in average income in a community. 
 
First, household spending on sports – direct spending on tickets, licensed 
merchandise, etc. and indirect spending on food and drinks at or near a 
sports facility - is highly substitutable for other forms of entertainment   8 
spending like movie tickets, food and drinks in areas of the city far from 
the facility, bowling and the like.  Professional sport does not induce 
residents to increase total spending by drawing on savings or borrowing 
against future earnings.  Residents maintain their level of entertainment 
spending but alter the allocation of this spending toward sport-related 
spending and away from other close substitutes.  Sports redirect spending 
by residents from one part of the local economy to another.   Coates and 
Humphreys (2003) report that earnings and employment in the 
Amusements and Recreation sector (SIC Code industry 79) – the sector of 
the economy containing professional sports - rise and earnings and 
employment at Eating and Drinking Establishments (SIC 58) and Retail 
Trade establishments fall with the size of the professional sports 
environment in cities. 
 
Impact analysis studies routinely ignore reductions in spending on other 
forms of entertainment due to substitution in private spending when they 
compute spending increases from the construction of a stadium or arena 
and the presence of a professional sports franchise.  This systematically 
overstates the claimed economic benefits from new sports facilities and 
excludes any potential economic harm done to other businesses in the 
entertainment sector of the local economy. 
 
Impact analysis studies also claim that a new sports facility will attract 
new visitors to a city, leading to additional economic benefits.  Visitors 
attracted by a new sports facility may occupy hotel rooms and eat meals 
that would have been purchased by visitors who came to the city for other 
reasons, and the direct spending on sport made by these visitors would 
have gone to other entertainment establishments.  Porter (1999) and 
Porter and Fletcher (2002) report little or no increase in hotel occupancy 
rates, retail sales, or airport traffic in cities that hosted Super Bowls and 
Olympic Games in the U.S. in the past ten years. 
 
Second, the existence of professional sports may result in workers 
spending less time on the job working and more time on the job 
handicapping the upcoming game or discussing the outcome of the last 
game.  This time is recorded as time at work, but production is lower, 
resulting in lower income.  To date, no research has focused on the link 
between productivity and professional sports.  However, Coates and 
Humphreys (2002b) found that income per person was higher in the city 
that was home to the Super Bowl champion the previous season and 
Berument and Yucel (2003) found a positive relationship between the 
growth in industrial production and soccer wins in a city in Turkey,   9 
providing some evidence of a link between sports and the productivity or 
workers. 
 
Third, money spent subsidizing the professional sports franchises may 
come at the expense of other important and highly productive public 
services.  For example, there may be fewer police on the street, fewer 
firemen, less frequently repaired streets and highways, a weaker 
education system, and so on.  All of these may result in lower productivity 
of workers and, therefore, lower incomes.  No evidence exists that 
professional sports have a detectable impact on local government spending 
or tax revenues.  Given the lack of support for the notion that professional 
sport raises income or employment, this appears to be an important topic 
for future research. 
 
Fourth, the multiplier for spending on sports in a city may be 
substantially smaller than the multiplier on other forms of entertainment 
spending, perhaps the most plausible explanation.  The majority of the 
revenues from professional sports go into salaries for players, managers, 
coaches, trainers, scouts and to income for the ownership.  Most of these 
individuals, especially the more highly paid ones, do not live full time in 
the city where the games take place.  Unlike the wages and salaries paid 
to employees of local restaurants, movie theaters, car dealerships, 
department stores, etc., the large salaries earned by players and coaches 
leak out of the local economy.  Moreover, the spending and saving patterns 
of relatively highly paid players, with relatively short careers, differ from 
those of typical workers.  Specifically, players save a larger portion – and 
spend a smaller portion - of their earnings than the typical worker because 
the wealthy tend to save more than the non-wealthy and because the high 
earnings of players are transitory and a substantial fraction will be saved 
until the years after their playing days are over.  Also, Siegfried and 
Zimbalist (2000) emphasize that the size of the multiplier on spending on 
professional sport also depends on the location where the spending takes 
place.  They claim that, because of the factors discussed above, the size of 
the multiplier varies directly with the radius of a circle drawn around the 
stadium. 
 
In each of the four cases described above, the additional income generated 
from subsidies to professional sports is lower than it would be had the 
money been spent in alternative uses.  Consequently, when comparing a 
city with a sports franchise to one without such a franchise, all other 
things equal, one will find income lower in the former.   
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Alternatively, the observed lower income may simply be a measure of the 
value of the sports environment, a “compensating wage differential.”  Just 
as wages are higher in jobs with more risk or requiring more skill, and 
lower in cities with desirable amenities like pleasant weather, good 
schools, and little pollution, wages may be lower in communities with 
professional sports franchises because citizens are willing to forego some 
income to have access to that amenity.  Unlike the previous explanations, 
a compensating wage differential does not entail any direct link between 
the sports facility and economic activities.  It does require sufficient in 
migration of individuals with strong preferences for access to professional 
sports and out migration of individuals without these preferences to 
produce a steady-state equilibrium with lower wages in cities with 
professional sports.   
 
 
The Importance of Non-Pecuniary Benefits 
 
The evidence suggests that urban economies receive no positive economic 
benefits from the billions of dollars of public subsidies provided for the 
construction of new professional sports facilities in the past, and that 
professional sports may have a small but negative impact on local 
economies.  What benefits have taxpayers received from these subsidies, 
and are they large enough to justify the costs? 
 
A common justification for subsidizing professional sports is that there are 
substantial positive externalities from sports and that these would not be 
available without subsidies.  For example, proponents of sports led 
development frequently refer to the "world class" city status conferred on a 
city by the presence of professional sports franchises.  It is also common to 
point out that citizens of a community may derive enjoyment from 
following the exploits of the local teams on television, the radio, or in the 
newspaper, but never attend a game.  The difficulty is in measuring these 
benefits, whether from the world class city effect or the enjoyment of the 
fans, because these are not traded in a market where their value is 
determined. 
 
Coates and Humphreys (1999) suggest that the negative impact on per 
capita personal income they find may be a measure of the value of the 
professional sports environment to the citizens.  The reduced income is 
implicit compensation for the access to the sports environment of the city.  
The increase in per capita income associated with winning the Super Bowl 
that Coates and Humphreys (2002b) found may measure the benefits of   11 
the world class city, as the victory swells the workers with pride and 
makes them happier and more productive. 
 
Johnson and Whitehead (2000) and Johnson, Groothius, and Whitehead 
(2002) use the contingent valuation approach to measuring the benefits of 
sports stadiums and sports franchises, respectively.  In this approach, 
researchers ask individuals how much they would pay to avoid an 
undesirable event or to acquire a desirable one.  For example, in Johnson, 
Groothius, and Whitehead (2002) people are told the local professional 
hockey team may leave town because their current arena is not adequate 
to generate sufficient revenues to put a quality team on the ice.  They are 
then told that the city is considering buying the team to keep it in town 
and that doing so would require a tax increase of $X, where X is randomly 
assigned to the respondent and was either 1, 5, 10 or 25 dollars.  Finally, 
the respondent is asked if he or she would be willing to pay $X each year 
in higher city taxes to keep the team in town.  Respondents were then 
asked the most they would be willing to pay and presented with a card 
with dollar amounts listed for them to choose from.  The study "suggests 
that the value of public goods generated by major league sports teams may 
not be large enough to justify the large public subsidies" (Johnson, et. al., 
2002). 
 
Carlino and Coulson (2002) estimate hedonic regressions of rents and 
wages to determine the extent to which these values are influenced by the 
presence of a team from the National Football League in the city.  Their 
goal is to assess the value of the "public goods" the football team provides 
to the city and to compare that to the subsidies paid to the teams.  In 
equilibrium, the value of such goods will be capitalized into rents and 
wages, with rents being higher and wages lower than they would be in an 
identical city without a football team.  They find about a 8% boost in rents 
associated with the NFL and a 2% reduction in wages.  Based on these 
values, Carlino and Coulson conclude that the value of the public goods is 
substantially larger than the subsidies paid by cities and states to 
professional football teams.  Coates and Humphreys (2001b) report similar 
results for professional football, basketball and baseball using a larger 
sample of data. 
 
The literature focused on measuring the non-pecuniary benefits of sports 
franchises and facilities shows considerable promise.  These papers apply 
novel empirical approaches to data not previously used in to study the 
economic impact of sports.  The results are interesting in that the results 
from wage models estimated with micro data imply large non-pecuniary   12 
consumption benefits when aggregated across the population of the typical 
metropolitan area.  However, this research is still in its infancy and more 
work needs to be done. 
 
What About Mega-Events? 
 
If the overall sports environment has no impact on the local economy, 
perhaps one-time, short duration, large attendance events like the Super 
Bowl or the Olympic Games will aid growth and development of the local 
economy.  Evidence on this issue is mixed.   
 
Humphreys (1994) examined the effect on Georgia of hosting the 1994 
Super Bowl.  This study estimated the economic impact of hosting the 
Super Bowl was $166 million in spending, $56 million in additional 
earnings, and 2,736 jobs.  However, this study was retrospective only in 
that it used actual net attendance at the game.  The impacts were 
measured using multipliers based on net attendance. 
 
Hotchkiss, Moore, and Zobay (2003) examined the counties in Georgia 
for evidence of effects from hosting the 1996 Summer Olympic Games.  
They find that in those counties close to or hosting Olympic activities 
that employment rose by 17% more than it did in non-Olympic venue 
counties.  The evidence did not, however, find strong effects of the 
Olympics on wages.  
 
Porter (1999) examined monthly commercial sales, hotel rates, and room 
occupancy data in three counties that hosted 6 Super Bowls between 1979 
and 1996.  He found one Super Bowl produced a small rise in commercial 
sales, two generated slight declines in commercial sales and that three 
others had no detectable effects. 
 
Coates and Humphreys (2002b) examined the impact of hosting the Super 
Bowl as well as participation in the league playoffs or championships in 
baseball, basketball, and football.  They found no statistically significant 
effect of any of these on local income.  Interestingly, the one effect they did 
find to be statistically significant was for the home city of the winning 
team from the Super Bowl.  In the year the team wins, income in the home 
city is larger than it would otherwise have been. 
 
Porter and Fletcher (2002) examined hotel occupancy, hotel room rates 
and traffic at the local airports for the effects of the Olympic Games held 
in Atlanta and Salt Lake City.  If the Olympics generate the economic   13 
development the proponents claim, measured perhaps by the increased 
sales, then one should see that hotel occupancy rates climb and that 
arrivals at the local airports are larger than otherwise.  What they found 
is that the rent on hotel rooms climbs dramatically, by 138% in Atlanta 
and 123% in Salt Lake City, but that occupancy rates and arrivals at the 
airports are essentially unchanged.  Sales increased in Atlanta by $122.6 
million, relative to a monthly average of $2.42 billion, but fell in Salt Lake 
City by $78.4 million. 
 
Unlike the literature on the economic impact of sports teams and 
facilities on incomes and employment, there is some evidence that mega 
sporting events like the Super Bowl or the Olympic Games may have a 
beneficial effect on urban economies.  However, this positive evidence is 
offset by compelling evidence that these events also simply re-distribute 
spending to different parts of the urban economy.  Furthermore, the two 
cases where positive economic impacts have been found are both in the 
same city, Atlanta, Georgia, and occurred only two years apart.   
Furthermore, one of these studies is primarily a prospective 
investigation.  The evidence of positive economic benefits from mega 
sporting events should be considered weak at best. 
 
 
Voting on Sports Subsidies 
 
Stadiums and arenas have been sold to communities across the United 
States for their beneficial effects on economic growth, development, and 
urban renewal.  Voters are frequently asked to support subsidies for 
professional sports and some research has focused on these events.   
Fort (1997, 1999), Blair and Swindell (1997), and Brown and Paul 
(1999) have each examined voting in referendums on sports subsidies as 
case studies, descriptive narratives, or in a purely theoretical context.  
Agostini, Quigley and Smolensky (1997) report statistical evidence, in 
the form of estimates from a regression model at the census tract level, 
relating the proportion of the vote that was favorable to a variety of 
socio-demographic variables.  The upshot of their analysis is that higher 
income, better-educated voters were more likely to favor the initiative.  
Males, counter-intuitively, were more likely to oppose the subsidy for 
the stadium.  Asians also were more likely to favor it. 
 
A short-coming of the Agostini, et al., (1997) analysis is that the 
regressions did not account for proximity to either the existing facility 
or to the site proposed for the new stadium.  Coates and Humphreys   14 
(2002c) address this issue examining a series of referenda in Brown 
County, Wisconsin, home of the National Football League's Green Bay 
Packers, and in Harris County, Texas, home of the Houston Rockets of 
the National Basketball Association.  They match voting precincts to 
census tracts in each location, estimating logit models on referendum 
results controlling for socio-demographic variables and proximity to the 
facilities or the proposed locations of new venues. 
 
In Green Bay, the first referendum concerned whether to increase the 
sales tax rate with the proceeds going to renovate the existing football 
stadium.  Subsequent referenda addressed the disposition of any 
revenues from the sales tax that remained after the stadium bills were 
paid and whether or not the community should sell the right to name 
the stadium as a way of reducing the tax cost of the renovation.  The 
evidence from Green Bay indicates that the people closest to the 
stadium supported the idea of raising the tax to refurbish the field, but 
that people living farther from the stadium were not statistically more 
or less likely to support the subsidy. 
 
The story in Harris County, Texas is more complicated.  There, 
referenda proposing new taxes on rental cars and hotel and motel stays 
were on the ballot in two successive years.  In each case, the proceeds of 
the taxes would be used to pay for the construction of a new arena for 
the Houston Rockets.  The first referendum differed from the second 
one in that it also included a surcharge on tickets to events at the 
arena.  The first referendum failed while the second one passed.  
 
The evidence from voting on the referenda in Harris County suggests 
two interesting things.  First, people living in and around the existing 
facility and people living in and around the site of the proposed facility 
were more likely to vote in favor of the tax increase for stadium 
construction.  This seems to suggest that people with experience living 
in the neighborhood of an arena did not find that a net gain.  On the 
other hand, people in the vicinity of the proposed facility expected net 
benefits from living in close proximity to the venue.  Second, because 
the two locations are quite close to one another, some precincts are 
"close" to both sites.  Such people tended to vote against the subsidy.   
 
Coates and Humphreys (2002c) conclude that living near an arena or 
stadium is a mixed blessing.  Some people find the additional traffic, 
the noise, and garbage, etc., too high a cost to pay for whatever benefits 
they may obtain.  Others, like those living near to Lambeau Field in   15 
Green Bay, appear to find living close to the stadium provides enough 
benefits to cover the annoyance of game day traffic in their 
neighborhood.  What role is played by the difference between football, 
with roughly 10 home dates a year in Green Bay versus basketball with 
at least 41 home dates is unclear. 
 
 
Summary and Directions for Future Research 
 
The growing literature on the economic impact of professional sports 
facilities and franchises on urban economies should prove to be a fertile 
area for future research.  New stadium and arena construction is in the 
midst of a boom period.  Cities are increasingly interested in these 
facilities as the centerpiece of urban renewal projects, and may be willing 
to invest hundreds of millions of dollars in public subsidies on these 
projects.  Despite a growing body of academic research that contains no 
evidence supporting the idea that sports facilities are important engines of 
economic growth, the sizable gulf between the predictions of prospective 
“economic impact studies” and the academic literature still exists; 
proposed stadium and arena construction projects still go forward based 
on the promise of large positive tangible economic benefits flowing from 
these projects.  The flawed “multiplier” approach remains firmly 
entrenched as the empirical tool of choice among proponents of stadium 
subsidies.  Only additional careful empirical research, and better 
dissemination of the existing results in the literature, can close the gulf 
between “impact studies” and academic research and help tax payers to 
make informed decisions about subsidies for sports facility construction.   
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The appropriate definition of the area of interest for the economic impact 
for a sports facility needs to be carefully considered. Most studies of the 
economic impact of sports teams and facilities focus on the effects of the 
sports environment on an entire city or standard metropolitan statistical 
area (SMSA).  A common criticism of the impact analysis methodology is 
that it makes a great deal of difference if one defines the local market 
narrowly or broadly.  For example, if one considers only the neighborhood 
surrounding the stadium, then the number of “out of town” visitors 
includes fans from the suburbs and even from other neighborhoods within 
the city.  On the other hand, if one includes the entire SMSA, the sports 
environment may become essentially a trivial part of the overall economy. 
 One can level these same criticisms on the retrospective studies that have 
found little effect of the sports environment on the economy of the entire 
SMSA. 
 
Is it possible professional sports facilities and franchises generate some 
localized positive economic benefits that cannot be detected in data 
aggregated to the level of SMSAs?  This question is closely related to the 
one discussed above.  If the economic benefits from sports teams and 
facilities are distributed unevenly across cities, then spatial models of 
economic behavior hold promise for increasing our understanding.       
Coates and Humphreys (2002a) recently undertook a preliminary spatial 
analysis on the economic impact of sports facilities.  In this paper they 
draw rings of different diameter around each stadium or arena in use in 
1990 and collect information on property values, rents, age of the 
housing stock, and population within those rings.  They then use 
regression methods to explain how the property values and rents 
change from the inner most ring to more distant rings.  Their results 
suggest the possibility of some narrowly focused positive benefits, but this 
study focuses on housing values and rents.  Many of the claimed economic 
benefits flowing from sports facilities take the form of job creation.     17 
 
If the stadium or arena has effects on the local economy, one might think 
that those effects would appear most obviously in the vicinity of the 
facility.  Proponents of stadium and arena led growth typically contend 
that restaurants, bars, and hotels in the area will expand their business as 
fans patronize the establishments before and after the game.  If this 
argument is correct, then property values and rents should rise as the 
present value of the new stream of profits is capitalized into property 
values.  On the other hand, property values may fall as the presence of 
rowdy, drunken fans in the neighborhood makes it a less pleasant place to 
live or operate a business. 
 
The results suggest that property values are slightly higher in the first 
ring, with a diameter of a half mile.  Property values in the other more 
distant rings are not statistically different from one another, and rents are 
not statistically different in any of the rings. The evidence from this 
preliminary study is consistent, therefore, with the results examining the 
entire SMSA which find no effect of the sports environment on the local 
economy.   
 
Further research in this area should focus on employment and the 
formation and destruction of new businesses; however, such research 
requires a significant amount of data work, as most sources of firm-specific 
data do not contain precise information on the location of the firms and 
are not integrated with geographical information system software. 
 
The sports environment in a city, like good weather or access to a coast, 
may be viewed by workers as an amenity for which they receive 
compensating wage differentials.  If true, then the interpretation of the 
observed reduction in income per capita in cities with professional sports 
teams changes considerably.  Rather than a drain on the local economy, 
firms in a city with professional sports teams can hire workers at a lower 
wage than firms in cities without professional sports teams.   
 
To answer this question, researchers must turn to longitudinal or cross-
sectional microeconomic data in order to control for the effects of 
individual characteristics like education and experience on wages.  Some 
promising preliminary evidence supporting this theory has recently 
emerged.  In particular, Coates and Humphreys (2001b) and Carlino and 
Coulson (2002) both provide evidence of a compensating wage differential 
associated with professional sports, based on microeconomic data from the 
Current Population Survey.   18 
 
The idea of compensating wage differentials linked to professional sports 
teams also hinges critically on the effect of access to sports on migration 
decisions.  The existence of compensating wage differentials depends 
critically on a steady-state equilibrium where individuals sort themselves 
into cities based on the amenities and wages across these cities.  To date, 
no research has examined the link between migration and sports, but this 
area is ripe for additional empirical analysis.   
 
Opportunity costs in public spending have long been considered as a 
potential link between professional sports and negative economic 
outcomes.  If the local government spends large sums on building and 
operating a professional sports facility, then less may be spent on public 
health, public safety, education, infrastructure and other publicly provided 
goods.  In the long run, this could reduce earnings in cities.  The 
proponents of these subsidies also claim that tax revenues will increase as 
a result of the construction of new sports facilities, but no retrospective 
research has examined this issue.  Despite the wealth of data on state and 
local government spending and revenues, there has been no research into 
the impact of professional sports teams and facilities on government 
budgets.  Clearly, this is another area with room for additional research. 
 
Finally, as Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) pointed out, referenda on sports 
subsidies tend to be close contests and often appear on the ballot multiple 
times.  They are also characterized by significant spending by the pro-
subsidy side.  Despite the potential to reveal important information about 
the preferences of tax payers for sports subsidies, few empirical studies 
have examined the determinants of these votes.  The existing empirical 
research on these referenda, summarized earlier, has not taken into 
account the effects of spending by the well-financed proponents of stadium 
subsidies.   19 
 
 
Table 1: New Sport Facility Construction in the US Since 1998 
Real 2003 Dollars 
          Age of  











Cincinnati, OH  Baseball  2003  $297 mil.  $297 mil.  34 
Detroit,MI  Football   2002  $306 mil.  $199 mil.  27 
Houston, TX  Football  2002  $374 mil.  $257 mil.  37 
Boston, MA  Football  2002  $332 mil.  none  31 
Seattle,WA  Football   2002  $408 mil.  $306 mil.  26 
San Antonio, TX  Basketball  2002  $179 mil.  $179 mil.  9 
Denver, CO  Football   2001  $417 mil.  $313 mil.  41 
Pittsburgh, PA  Football   2001  $263 mil.  $183 mil.  31 
Dallas, TX  Basketball*  2001  $438 mil.  $219 mil.  21 
Milwaukee, WI  Baseball  2001  $410 mil.  $317 mil.  48 
Pittsburgh, PA  Baseball  2001  $273 mil.  $231 mil.  31 
Cincinnati, OH  Football  2000  $479 mil.  $479 mil.  31 
Atlanta, GA  Basketball*  2000  $227 mil.  $195 mil.  3 
Detroit, MI  Baseball  2000  $319 mil.  $122 mil.  88 
Houston, TX  Baseball  2000  $266 mil.  $191 mil.  35 
San Francisco, CA  Baseball  2000  $351 mil.  $11 mil.  40 
Cleveland, OH  Football  1999  $311 mil.  $311 mil.  53 
Nashville, TN  Football  1999  $319 mil.  $319 mil.  -- 
Denver, CO  Basketball*  1999  $187 mil.  $10 mil.  24 
Los Angeles, CA  Basketball*  1999  $363 mil.  $65 mil.  32 
Indianapolis, IN  Basketball  1999  $201 mil.  $87 mil.  25 
Seattle, WA  Baseball  1999  $587 mil.  $409 mil.  23 
Baltimore, MD  Football  1998  $251 mil.  $251 mil.  44 
Tampa, FL  Football  1998  $190 mil.  $190 mil.  22 
Miami, FL  Basketball*  1998  $197 mil.  none  10 
Phoenix, AZ  Baseball  1998  $392 mil.  $267 mil.  -- 
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Notes 
 
(1) Roger Noll and Andrew Zimbalist (1997) also discuss the 
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